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Abstract: The tobacco industry has developed an extensive array of 
strategies and arguments to prevent or weaken government regulation. These 
strategies and arguments are well documented at the domestic level. 
However, there remains a need to examine how these arguments are 
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reflected in the challenges waged by governments within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Decisions made at the WTO have the potential to shape 
how countries govern. Our analysis was conducted on two novel tobacco 
control measures: tobacco additives bans (Canada, United States and Brazil) 
and plain, standardized packaging of tobacco products (Australia, New 
Zealand, Ireland, EU and UK). We analyzed WTO documents (i.e. meeting 
minutes and submissions) (n = 62) in order to identify patterns of 
argumentation and compare these patterns with well-documented industry 
arguments. The pattern of these arguments reveal that despite the unique 
institutional structure of the WTO, country representatives opposing novel 
tobacco control measures use the same non-technical arguments as those 
that the tobacco industry continues to use to oppose these measures at the 
domestic level. 
Keywords: Tobacco control, Tobacco industry, Government regulation, Trade 
law 
1. Introduction 
The tobacco industry does not like to be regulated. Tobacco 
industry resistance to government regulation through the strategies 
they employ has become the model of deceitful corporate practice 
(Negin, 2015). By tobacco industry, we are referring to the broad 
network of commercial interests associated with tobacco production, 
distribution and sale. For example, apart from transnational cigarette 
companies, tobacco growers associations such as the International 
Tobacco Growers Association are notorious opponents to tobacco 
control measures globally (McDaniel et al., 2008). The canon of 
tobacco industry strategies includes direct lobbying to shape 
government decision-making (Hiilamo, 2003, Howell, 2012, Neuman 
et al., 2002 and Peeters et al., 2015); the production and manipulation 
of scientific evidence (McDaniel et al., 2008, Muggli et al., 2003, Ong 
and Glantz, 2000 and Otanez et al., 2009); the creation, support and 
mobilization of manufacturers associations and other front groups 
(McDaniel et al., 2008, Mejia et al., 2008, Nakkash and Lee, 2009, 
Ong and Glantz, 2000 and Peeters et al., 2015); and the promotion of 
voluntary agreements and/or health education initiatives (Crosbie 
et al., 2012, Nakkash and Lee, 2009 and Saloojee and Dagli, 2000). 
These strategies are supported by a systematic attempt to shape the 
discourses pertaining to tobacco in the health and economic domains. 
The tobacco industry has vigorously presented arguments that attempt 
to minimize the perceived harm of tobacco consumption while ensuring 
that the burden of responsibility for consumption is shifted to the 
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consumer (Balbach et al., 2006 and Saloojee and Dagli, 2000). In 
countries around the world, the tobacco industry has appropriated the 
individual rights frame to argue that consumers must be informed but 
not controlled (Crosbie et al., 2012 and Hiilamo, 2003). Another 
perennial argument made by tobacco interests is that tobacco is an 
economic necessity, both as a revenue generator for governments 
(Howell, 2012 and Shirane et al., 2012; K. E. Smith, Savell and 
Gilmore, 2013) and a source of employment for its citizens (McDaniel 
et al., 2008, Nakkash and Lee, 2009 and Ong and Glantz, 2000). The 
arguments generated to resist regulation are invoked so often that 
they have formed a predictable pattern. In 2011, Action on Smoking 
and Health, a UK-based anti-tobacco civil society organization, 
categorized the three main industry arguments used to oppose all 
forms of tobacco control measures (ASH, 2011): 1) stand up for small 
businesses and defend those employed in the tobacco sector, 2) 
tobacco control measures will result in a rise in the illicit trade of 
tobacco and 3) tobacco control measures are/will be ineffective. The 
report's authors drew from empirical evidence to refute each of these 
arguments. 
At the international level, there have also been efforts to 
identify tobacco industry strategies and patterns of argumentation to 
oppose global tobacco control. Specifically, work has been conducted 
to examine tobacco industry opposition to the Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the international treaty negotiated and 
ratified under the auspices of the World Health Organization 
(WHO)that creates an international legal framework to promote 
tobacco control amongst its now 180 member countries. This research 
found that the tobacco industry used familiar strategies, including 
lobbying specific governments in order to derail the negotiations 
(Grüning et al., 2011), and consistently asserting the economic 
benefits of tobacco production (Mamudu et al., 2008 and Otanez et al., 
2009). 
Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have also worked 
vigorously to strengthen their global presence through market 
liberalization. This process is facilitated by direct and indirect efforts to 
reduce government control of tobacco products and reduce barriers in 
the tobacco supply chain, such as tariff reductions to facilitate the 
movement of tobacco products across borders and the easing of 
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investment rules to further enhance international supply chains. For 
example, Holden and colleagues demonstrate how TTCs attempted to 
facilitate China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
order to benefit from trade rules that require market access for foreign 
firms (Holden et al., 2010). Scholars have also argued that the greater 
the presence of TTCs along the supply chain (i.e. from leaf growing to 
sale of final products), the greater the opportunity to influence the 
policy landscape in favour of their policy preferences (Bump and Reich, 
2013 and Holden and Lee, 2009). Specific to the trade context, recent 
research has found that it is primarily low-income countries opposing 
tobacco control measures at the WTO (Eckhardt et al., 2015). Eckhardt 
et al. (2015) note that given a “lack of a clear pattern of economic 
interests among countries opposing tobacco control policies at the 
WTO lends support to the proposition that TTCs are exerting influence” 
(p. 5). Our study provides further support to this proposition by 
analyzing the actual arguments presented at the WTO in opposition to 
novel tobacco control measures. Our study provides a logical extension 
to existing literature by providing a qualitative analysis of how this 
opposition is framed and represented in relation to more generic 
patterns of oppositional rhetoric found in policy discourse. 
The WTO is arguably the most important forum for agenda-
setting and decision-making on international economic issues. 
Decisions made at the WTO have the potential to shape how countries 
govern, including in the areas of public health (Drope and Lencucha, 
2014 and McGrady, 2011). Since its founding in 2005, there have been 
over thirty tobacco-related challenges at the WTO (Lester, 2015), and 
it is widely recognized that states must now vet their tobacco control 
measures against WTO law (Drope and Lencucha, 2013, Drope and 
Lencucha, 2014, Jarman, 2014, Lencucha and Drope, 2015, McGrady 
and Jones, 2013, Mitchell and Voon, 2011a and Mitchell and Voon, 
2011b). In the WTO context, member states are granted the space to 
question the compatibility of tobacco control measures with the 
different agreements that make up the corpus of legal texts that 
constitute the WTO. For example, informal challenges (i.e. “questions” 
about compatibility) can be raised in the different committees of the 
WTO such as the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committee or the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
committee. If they choose, a Member can also move a complaint to 
formal dispute settlement through the Dispute Settlement 
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Understanding (DSU). Challenges brought forward at the WTO involve 
states arguing against states (state-state), rather than the 
aforementioned dynamics in which the tobacco industry directly 
challenges state regulations (industry-state). This context is important 
for our analysis, as we argue that despite this state-state apparatus, 
the same industry arguments are observable. In other words, 
governments within this key international venue are repeating 
arguments often identical to those promoted by the tobacco industry. 
The first tobacco-related trade dispute was brought forward 
under the WTO's precursor agreement, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This case involved the United States and 
Thailand, and resulted in a decision that forced Thailand to open its 
market to transnational tobacco companies (TTC) (McGrady, 
2011 and Vateesatokit et al., 2000). Since the panel report was 
adopted in 1990, there has been a stream of challenges to tobacco 
control measures at the WTO (Lester, 2015). These challenges have 
prompted a number of legal scholars and political scientists to analyze 
the relationship between tobacco control and the rules that exist in the 
WTO system. Much of the thrust of their analyses articulates the ways 
in which tobacco control legislation and regulations can be crafted to 
reduce the likelihood that such measures could be challenged as being 
inconsistent with trade law(Jarman, 2013, Jarman et al., 2012, 
Liberman, 2013 and McGrady, 2011; Mitchell and AuthorAnonymous, 
2012 and Mitchell and Sheargold, 2014). 
The technical-legal scholarship in this field has provided a robust 
basis to defend most existing and novel tobacco control measures at 
the WTO. Our study complements this legal scholarship utilizing a 
sociolinguistic perspective to examine the various formal and informal 
challenges to novel tobacco control measures at the WTO. This type of 
analysis contributes to the broader understanding of challenges waged 
against tobacco control using trade law by identifying the arguments 
that governments use to oppose or at least question the technical-
legal legitimacy of such measures. The pattern of these arguments 
reveals that country representatives oppose novel tobacco control 
measures using common non-technical arguments as a basis for the 
legal arguments; the same as those used by the tobacco industry to 
oppose these measures at the domestic level. We discuss how this 
alignment exposes the conflation of government and industry 
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interests. From this baseline analysis we discuss how this conflation 
reveals a more important dynamic: the relationship between 
unsubstantiated or misrepresented information presented as fact and 
the rhetoric of opposition. Our examination and categorization of the 
rhetoric of opposition to novel tobacco control measures at the WTO 
also allows for scrutiny and verifiability of whether this opposition is 
indeed based in evidence. 
2. Analytic framework 
The first task of our analysis is to identify generic patterns of 
argumentation, the rhetorical strategies used by representatives to 
argue against novel tobacco control legislation. Patterns of 
argumentation uncover the expectations governments have of each 
other. At one level the expectations will be overt, derived from the 
written rules that constitute the system of international law. At 
another level the forum for deliberation is itself norm-generating. By 
this we mean that through deliberation, meaning is attached to the 
written rules, not simply through a technical explication of the 
“original” meaning of the rule, but the actual formation of a world of 
meaning surrounding these rules, embedding these rules in a system 
of facts, values and morality. In this respect, the dialogue and 
argumentation within a particular institution, like the WTO, draws from 
existing norms and serves to reconfigure such norms by giving 
meaning to political practices (such as product regulation) in a broader 
social, historical, political and economic context. This perspective is 
decidedly constructivist in its assumptions. These assumptions are 
best encapsulated by the two basic tenets of constructivism presented 
by Alexander Wendt: 1) “that the structures of human association are 
determined primarily by shared ideas” and, 2) “that the identities and 
interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas 
rather than by a given nature” ( Wendt, 1999). As Robert Cover states 
“The rules and principles of justice [are] but a small part of the 
normative universe that ought to claim our attention. No set of legal 
institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate 
it and give it meaning” (Cover, 1983). What Cover is characterizing is 
not a form of rule interpretation that uncovers the objective foundation 
of legal precepts making the original or intended form more clearly 
visible, but rather rules in a wider meaning-making process – a 
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shaping and reshaping of the original form. Formal rules are explicit 
and can be found in binding international agreements such as the 
WTO's TBT, and the WHO's FCTC. When we look to the patterns of 
argument within the WTO, we situate them first within the formal 
structure of rules. For example, it is not surprising to see arguments 
that novel tobacco control legislation is restrictive to trade, because 
the basic legal framework of the WTO is oriented towards facilitating 
the free movement of goods and services. What is more interesting 
from a social science perspective, however, is examining such 
argumentation as expressions of implicit norms perpetuated through 
discourse amongst countries. Our analytic framework thus categorizes 
patterns of argumentation used to support legal assertions. The 
specific arguments within these categories, once identified, can be 
predicted in future challenges and scrutinized for their accuracy. In 
addition, our analysis provides insights into conflicting norms at the 
intersection of public health and trade policy. 
Our analytic framework draws from the three reactive-
reactionary theses articulated by Albert Hirschman (Hirschman, 1991) 
that comprised common patterns of argumentative opposition to what 
he termed “progressive” political reform movements. We use 
Hirschman's theses as a heuristic to organize and present our analysis, 
as well as situate this analysis within a more general literature on 
rhetoric and opposition to policy change. Hirschman defined the first 
‘perversity’ thesis as the assertion that “any purposive action to 
improve some feature of the political, social or economic order only 
serves to exacerbate the condition one wishes to remedy” (Hirschman, 
1991). The ‘futility’ thesis “holds that attempts at social transformation 
will be unavailing, that they will simply fail to “make a dent”” 
(Hirschman, 1991). The ‘jeopardy’ thesis “argues that the cost of 
proposed change or reform is too high as it engenders some previous, 
precious accomplishment” (Hirschman, 1991). Hirschman contends 
that these theses “can be invoked by any group that opposes or 
criticizes new policy proposals or newly enacted policies”. 
3. Methods 
Our analysis was conducted on two novel tobacco control 
measures: tobacco additives bans (Canada, United States and Brazil) 
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and plain, standardized packaging of tobacco products (Australia, New 
Zealand, Ireland, EU and UK). We reviewed documents for eight cases 
pertaining to these two measures, including meeting minutes of the 
TBT committee and TRIPS Council, individual country submissions to 
these meetings, and formal country submissions to the Dispute 
Settlement Body under the DSU (See Table 1 for included documents). 
These cases were chosen because they were challenged either 
informally (representatives from members raised concerns about the 
measure) or formally (one or more members filed a WTO dispute). The 
tobacco additives cases were addressed under the TBT, while the plain 
packaging cases were addressed under the TBT, TRIPS and the DSU. 
The arguments against the novel tobacco control measures were first 
organized according to country and then were entered into NVivo10 
qualitative software. 
Table 1. Documents included for analysis. 
Case Documents 
Brazil -Tobacco 
Additives Ban 
G/TBT/M/53, G/TBT/M/54, G/TBT/M/55, G/TBT/M/56 and 
G/TBT/M/67, G/TBT/N/BRA/407 
Canada - Cracking 
Down on Tobacco 
Marketing Aimed at 
Youth Act (Bill C-
32). 
G/TBT/M/49,G/TBT/M/50, G/TBT/M/51, G/TBT/M/52, 
G/TBT/M/53, G/TBT/W/329, G/TBT/W/330, G/TBT/W/331 and 
G/TBT/W/332 
United States – 
Clove Cigarettes 
G/TBT/M/49 and DS406/1 + country report: Indonesia: 
G/TBT/W/323 
European Union – 
Tobacco Products 
Directive 
G/TBT/M/59, G/TBT/M/60, G/TBT/M/61, IP/C/M/73 and 
IP/C/M/73Add.1 + country reports: Cuba: G/TBT/W/65 and 
G/TBT/W/371; Dominican Republic: G/TBT/W/358 and 
G/TBT/W/367; Malawi: G/TBT/W/360, G/TBT/W/369 and 
G/TBT/W/376; Zimbabwe: G/TBT/W/370; EU: G/TBT/N/EU/88 
Australia – Plain 
Packaging Bill 
IP/C/M/66, G/TBT/M/54, G/TBT/M/55, G/TBT/M/56, 
G/TBT/M/57, WT/DSB/M/322 
Ireland – Plain 
Packaging 
Legislation 
(Proposed) 
G/TBT/M/60, G/TBT/M/61 and G/TBT/M/62 + country reports: 
Malawi: G/TBT/W/368, G/TBT/W375 and G/TBT/W387; 
Dominican Republic: G/TBT/W/366 and G/TBT/W/374; Cuba: 
G/TBT/W/364 and G/TBT/W/380 
New Zealand – Plain 
Packing Legislation 
(Proposed) 
G/TBT/M/58, G/TBT/M/59, G/TBT/M/61 and 
G/TBT/M/62 + country reports: New Zealand: G/TBT/N/NZL/62 
and G/TBT/N/NZL/62/Add.1; Malawi: G/TBT/W/388;Dominican 
Republic: G/TBT/W/355 and G/TBT/W/359; Cuba: 
G/TBT/W/356 and G/TBT/W/381; Ukraine: G/TBT/W/384 
United Kingdom – 
Plain Packaging 
Legislation 
(Proposed) 
G/TBT/M/62 and G/TBT/W/379 
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3.1. Analysis 
We first analyzed the arguments using Hirschman's three theses 
framework to identify the different ways that representatives opposed 
novel tobacco control legislation. We then conducted a second level of 
analysis to identify the different sub-arguments used to bolster the 
overarching three theses. For example, a representative may argue 
that plain tobacco packaging will not work (futility thesis), but that 
tells us little about the nature of the argument. In this case we 
analyzed which arguments were asserted to support the futility claim. 
For example, we found that the argument that there was a “lack of 
scientific evidence” to support the legislation was used across all of our 
cases. We then deconstructed each sub-argument to assess what the 
claim was attempting to evoke or target. An overview of our findings is 
found in Table 2. Despite a myriad of arguments made against novel 
tobacco control measures there is an internal logic to the arguments 
that cuts across the cases we analyzed. This logic is tied to the basic 
principles underlying the WTO system but draws from the common 
arguments put forward by the tobacco industry against tobacco control 
measures. 
Table 2. Overview of findings. 
Thesis Argument 
Futility  There is no scientific evidence that the tobacco control measure 
will achieve its intended objectives. 
 The government must demonstrate through scientific evidence 
that the measure will indeed be effective. 
Perversity  The measure will lead to an increase in illicit products which will 
lead to an increase in consumption. 
 The measure will lead to an increase in the illicit market and 
potentially more harmful products. 
Jeopardy  The measure will disproportionately disadvantage developing 
economies. 
 The measure will harm the livelihoods of tobacco farmers and 
their families. 
3.2. Futility 
All of the countries that opposed the two different tobacco 
additives bans established by Brazil and Canada asserted that such 
bans would not achieve the intended objectives, i.e. that the measures 
would be futile. Within these challenges was a reliance on the 
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argument captured in the following statement by the representative 
from Turkey: “there is no scientific evidence to demonstrate that 
additives used in blended tobacco made those products either more 
attractive for consumers, more harmful to health or more addictive 
and more attractive to youth” (G/TBT/M/53, 2011). Malawi, Zambia, 
Mexico, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Jordan, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
Cuba and the European Union echoed this argument (G/TBT/M/53, 
2011, G/TBT/M/54, 2011 and G/TBT/M/55, 2012). This argument was 
used to support the contention that the measure was not “more trade 
restrictive than necessary,” a requirement within the TBT agreement. 
Article 2.2 of the TBT agreement states: 
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not 
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of 
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, 
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-
fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: 
national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; 
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or 
the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of 
consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical 
information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of 
products. 
The futility argument was combined with the contention that the 
country must provide scientific proof that the legislation will work. The 
asserted logic in this argument is that if a measure does not achieve 
its intended objective then it is not necessary and a de facto barrier to 
trade. This same logic was invoked by Malawi in its questioning of 
Ireland's proposal for plain packaging: 
“Plain packaging will not work. It will not achieve Ireland's 
health objectives. We have stated earlier that protecting health and 
reducing youth smoking are entirely legitimate objectives. But plain 
packaging will not achieve these objectives, and no credible evidence 
exists to demonstrate that it will. Young people decide to smoke based 
on various social factors, including peer pressure – not on packaging. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Social Science and Medicine, Vol 164 (September 2016): pg. 100-107. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
11 
 
Ireland's proposed measure will therefore be ineffective” 
(G/TBT/W/387, 2014). 
The futility argument exposes the salient, but often overlooked, 
issue of burden of proof. All of the countries asserted that novel 
tobacco control legislation, namely tobacco additives bans and plain 
packaging requirements, required scientific evidence to prove that it 
would meet its intended objectives. For example, in one of three 
submissions to the TBT committee, Malawi challenged the European 
Union to provide “credible scientific evidence to support the Tobacco 
Products Directive”, specifically that the ingredients bans and 
packaging requirements will “reduce smoking initiation and smoking 
rates” (G/TBT/W/360, 2013). 
3.3. Perversity 
Our analysis of the documents revealed further arguments 
waged against novel tobacco control measures in the form of the 
perversity thesis. The basic argument representing this category is 
that the novel tobacco control measure will have unintended harmful 
consequences. In the 2011 ASH report, the authors noted that in 
addition to industry arguments that tobacco control measures will not 
work, the industry almost always asserts that the measure will lead to 
an increase in illicit trade and counterfeit tobacco products (ASH, 
2011). Our analysis found the illicit trade argument was also used 
consistently and vigorously at the WTO, despite the fact that the WTO 
has no jurisdiction over illicit trade. In the Australia plain packaging 
case Cuba noted that plain packaging would lead to an increase in 
illicit trade “given that it would be easier to counterfeit a plain 
package” and could also promote the smuggling of “genuine packages” 
to satisfy demand (G/TBT/M/54, 2011). The Dominican Republic 
concurred that one of the “unwanted effects” of plain packaging would 
be a rise in illicit trade. Zambia furthered this argument by stating 
“Australia's legislation could expose consumers to more harmful 
tobacco products due to the proliferation of counterfeit products whose 
quality was not controlled by any regulatory body” (G/TBT/M/55, 
2012, p. 55). The first perversity argument is that the measure will 
lead to illicit trade and counterfeit products, which will lead to 
increased consumption. It was argued that not only will consumption 
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increase, but also the products being consumed may be more harmful 
because they are not regulated. The illicit trade-counterfeit argument 
was less dominant for the additives ban cases. It was referred to by 
Malawi in the Brazil, RDC/14/2012 case (Brazil, 2012), but no mention 
was made in Canada's Bill C-32 case. 
The second argument asserting the perversity thesis is that 
plain packaging would place greater competitive pressure on price. 
Representatives from the Dominican Republic argued that “if tobacco 
products were to be sold in standard packs that make product 
differentiation difficult, sellers may feel compelled to compete solely on 
the basis of price, causing a drop in retail prices which might in turn 
produce an increase in the demand and consumption of tobacco 
products, including cigarettes and cigars” (G/TBT/W/355, 2012). This 
line of arguments aligns with Hirschman's observation that 
“reactionaries” argue that a particular “action will produce, via a chain 
of unintended consequences, the exact contrary of the objective being 
proclaimed and pursued” ( Hirschman, 1991). Notably, it fails entirely 
to account for governments' ability to impose excise taxes to 
compensate for any price competition that tobacco firms might engage 
in. 
3.4. Jeopardy 
The jeopardy thesis was supported by two arguments. The first 
asserted that the novel tobacco control measure would harm the 
strides made by “developing countries” towards economic 
development. Referring to Brazil's additives ban, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia specifically invoked this concept when it stated, 
“This regulation jeopardizes the economy of countries under 
development” (G/TBT/M/53, 2011). Countries who were not major 
tobacco exporters to the country being challenged even asserted that 
the measure would serve as a “barrier to future growth potential” 
(G/TBT/M/53, 2011). Mozambique also referred to the effect that a 
tobacco additives ban would have on “export revenue and economic 
and development prospects” (G/TBT/M/53, 2011). Similarly, Nigeria 
referred to the implications of this measure to “agricultural and rural 
development objectives” (G/TBT/M/55, 2012, p. 55). In a submission 
to the TBT committee pertaining to Australia's plain packaging 
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legislation, the Dominican Republic expressed that they are “worried 
about the impact that the proposed measures could have on small and 
vulnerable economies which are largely dependent on the production 
and export of tobacco and tobacco products” (G/TBT/W/339, 2011). 
Chile also highlighted the need for Members to “take account of the 
special development, financial and trade needs of developing country 
Members, with a view to ensuring that such measures did not create 
unnecessary obstacles to exports from developing country Members” 
(G/TBT/M/54, 2011). 
The representatives aligned their argument with Article 12.3 of 
the TBT, which requires representatives to take into account the 
special needs of developing countries. In the additives ban cases, 
representatives argued that the measure was a de facto ban on 
traditional blended tobacco that use Burley tobacco leaf produced by 
countries like Malawi and Zambia. In response to the European Union 
Tobacco Products Directive (EUTPD), Malawi noted, “25% of the tax 
base that supports government operations comes from the tobacco 
industry” and “tobacco contributes at least 60% of Malawi's foreign 
export earnings” ( G/TBT/W/369, 2013). In the plain packaging cases 
the challenges represented a more generic argument that the measure 
would “impact small economies that largely depend on the production 
and export of tobacco” (G/TBT/W/339, 2011). A similar argument was 
made against the EUTPD measure where countries like Zimbabwe 
expressed concern that the measure would have a “negative impact on 
tobacco producing of developing countries” (G/TBT/M/59, 2013). This 
is a salient argument in the context of the WTO regime, where 
commentators have noted the challenges that many least-developed 
states encounter with the rules of open trade ( Amorim, 2000, Mitchell 
and Wallis, 2010 and Sell, 2004). Sell notes that “the costs of 
participating in venues such as the WTO can be prohibitive for those 
without substantial resources” (Sell, 2004). 
The second argument was similar to the first and asserted more 
specifically that the tobacco control measure would have a detrimental 
effect on the livelihoods of tobacco farmers, personalizing the costs 
rather than focusing solely on the aggregate economy. In the Brazil 
case, countries such as Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe argued that 
the tobacco additives ban would bring social problems to the families 
that rely on tobacco growth. Honduras argued that the Brazil case 
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would lead to “job losses” as did Malawi, stating that the measure 
would impact the approximately 700,000 farmers who cultivated 
tobacco in Malawi (G/TBT/M/53, 2011). Pointing to the use of this 
group as a rhetorical strategy, this number almost doubled in a 
statement made two years later for the EUTPD case where Malawi 
argued that the measure would harm the lives of “1.5 million tobacco 
farmers” (G/TBT/W/369, 2013). The same two arguments were made 
against Australia's plain packaging measure. The principal argument 
put forward in the plain packaging cases was that changing the 
packaging requirements the measure would place an added economic 
burden on the tobacco manufacturers. More generally, as Cuba 
argued, such measures were worrisome “above all for the developing 
countries with small economies” (G/TBT/W/356, 2012, p. 356). 
4. Discussion 
Despite the unique legal context of the WTO system, we find 
that common tobacco industry arguments have surfaced to challenge 
novel tobacco control measures. We discuss two dimensions of this 
finding. The first pertains to the rhetoric of opposition and nature of 
these types of arguments. The second pertains to the relationship 
between industry interests and representation of these interests at the 
WTO. 
Rhetoric is meant to persuade. One could argue that the ability 
for rhetoric to do this is to first assert compelling facts. The tobacco 
industry is perhaps the least trustworthy source of scientific 
information and interpretation (Gilmore et al., 2015 and Saloojee and 
Dagli, 2000). Despite decades of evidence that discredits the tobacco 
industry's ability to make scientific claims, it is clear that the 
misrepresentation and misuse of science is a tool that the industry 
continues to use. A dominant argument across the cases we analyzed 
was the assertion that novel tobacco measures will not work and that 
there is no scientific evidence to claim effectiveness. This assertion 
exists despite the obvious logic that one cannot prove the 
effectiveness of something until it is implemented. Moreover, recent 
analysis has demonstrated that the industry-sponsored research to 
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of plain packaging legislation is 
methodologically weak (Hatchard et al., 2014, Laverty et al., 
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2015 and Ulucanlar et al., 2014), while suggesting that the legislation 
in Australia (the first country to implement this measure) is indeed 
having the intended effect (Scollo et al., 2015 and Wakefield et al., 
2013). Experimental studies have also supported the effectiveness of 
plain packaging legislation (Hammond, 2010, Hammond et al., 
2013 and Thrasher et al., 2011). Another analysis has demonstrated 
that the evidence used by tobacco interests to oppose plain packaging 
legislation was weak and exaggerated (Evans-Reeves et al., 2014). 
In many ways, these dynamics are consistent with the broader 
so-called “precautionary principle” that has become particularly salient 
in discussions and negotiations around environmental policy. The 1992 
Rio Declaration states in Principle 15: “Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not 
be used as a reason to prevent environmental degradation” (UN, 
1992). In the case of novel tobacco control measures, the harm of 
tobacco products is irrefutable and the preliminary evidence for most 
novel measures clearly suggests that there is considerable potential for 
effectiveness, and certainly enough to permit trying these newer 
tobacco control interventions. Stewart calls this the “non-preclusion 
precautionary principle” and argues that “scientific uncertainly should 
not automatically preclude regulation of activities that pose risk of 
significant harm” (Stewart, 2002). 
The second element of rhetorical power is the ability to induce 
an emotional connection with the audience. One of the ways that the 
rhetoric opposing novel tobacco control measures has attempted to 
connect with the hearts of those involved in the inter-state enterprise 
is by evoking the protection and promotion of “economic 
development”. The jeopardy thesis evokes this development rhetoric 
on two levels, one being the gross economic development of the 
country and the second being the more personal dimension of 
individual employment and economic sustenance. This framing is 
resonant in a context where some have argued that the very 
legitimacy of the WTO rests on its ability to lift “developing” economies 
towards greater parity with high-income countries (Amorim, 2000, 
Barton et al., 2010 and Broude, 2006). Broude traces the history of 
development objectives within the WTO, arguing that the past two 
decades have resulted in the supplanting of the original objectives of 
the GATT to expand the production and trade of goods as an end in 
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itself, to a development agenda that he attributes to the WTO's 
“continued and frustrating quest for legitimacy” (Broude, 2006). A 
body of literature reflects this challenging quest for equity among 
states in the global economy and the role of the WTO in facilitating this 
process. Mitchell and Wallis point out the challenges in the 
conceptualization and application of the “special and differential 
treatment” principle that is embedded in the WTO legal framework 
while suggesting that this principle remains important for small states 
or developing economies (Mitchell and Wallis, 2010). Reference to this 
scholarship is simply meant to illustrate that arguments about the 
development needs of smaller or “developing” economies will likely 
resonate in the current context where the issue of equity and the 
different needs of states are salient and hotly debated, particularly 
when many argue that the WTO dispute settlement system serves to 
“exacerbate existing inequalities” between countries (Smith, 2004) 
Our findings provide a surprising counterpoint to research that 
shows that developing countries do not utilize the WTO dispute 
settlement system to the same extent as wealthier countries (Bown 
and Hoekman, 2005, Busch and Reinhardt, 2003, Smith, 
2004 and Wade, 2003). We find that those who oppose novel tobacco 
control measures are primarily developing countries. It should also be 
noted that most of the challenges are informal complaints expressed in 
the least costly venue, that of WTO committees. Countries like Zambia 
have never filed a formal complaint under the DSU at the WTO but are 
vociferous opponents in WTO committees to tobacco control measures 
(WTO, 2016). Malawi is another vocal opponent of tobacco control 
measures and has third party status in the Australia plain packaging 
case, while they have only been involved in one other case at the WTO 
(WTO, 2016). Cuba and the Dominican Republic have only served as a 
complainant in one case at the WTO: the Australia plain packaging 
case (WTO, 2016). It is well documented that companies such as Philip 
Morris International and British American Tobacco are providing funds 
for governments to pursue these disputes (Stumberg, 2013). Our 
findings provide more evidence, albeit indirect, of just how close the 
relationship is between the tobacco industry and government in these 
countries. 
One way to undercut the jeopardy argument brought forward by 
low-income countries is to demonstrate that the economic benefits of 
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tobacco to the tobacco leaf farmers are overstated. Again we return to 
the importance of facts in this context of competing rhetoric. 
Persuasion is undermined in part if proponents of tobacco control can 
demonstrate that the rhetoric of opposition is false. There is a need to 
continue to produce sound empirical evidence of the economic risks of 
tobacco production and particularly evidence that the desirability of 
tobacco farming (i.e. the employment argument) is overstated. This 
appears to be the case with Malawi in its own statements at the WTO, 
where we found that the stated number of farmers reliant on tobacco 
for their livelihoods is exaggerated. A recently published review finds 
that tobacco farmers struggle with high labour costs and inflated costs 
of inputs provided by the tobacco industry (Lecours, 2014). Perhaps 
more importantly, Lecours finds that there is a desperate need for 
more research on the economics of tobacco production in low- and 
middle-income countries. However, the existing research suggests that 
despite the appeal of the rhetoric of protecting the livelihoods of 
farmers, the reality may be much different. What this research does 
suggest is that tobacco farmers are indeed vulnerable, but not because 
of the regulation of the tobacco market. They are vulnerable because 
the inequities along the supply chain that make it difficult for them to 
sustain a decent livelihood (Otañez and Glantz, 2011 and Otanez 
et al., 2009). For example, recent economic survey research from 
Zambia illuminates a common scenario in which contracted farmers 
pay inflated input costs to leaf-buying companies that – in an 
oligopsonistic or even monopsonistic market – then pay farmers at 
below-global-market prices, typically trapping the farmers in a 
downward spiral of debt that condemns them to more years of growing 
tobacco at substantial losses (Goma et al., 2015). As the tobacco leaf 
buying firms appear to have calculated, the buyer-friendly situation is 
greatly helped by limited markets for other types of goods and that 
farmers do not perceive many better options even when there are 
some, such as bamboo in Kenya's tobacco-growing regions (Magati 
et al., 2012). Tobacco farming and other employment along the value 
chain is intrinsically problematic, but for reasons that stem from 
tobacco industry practices, limited access to other agricultural supply 
chains and a lack of strategic approaches to alternative livelihoods 
(Altman et al., 1996, Beaglehole et al., 2015 and Otañez et al., 2007). 
The lack of supply chains for alternative agricultural products is not 
simply a matter of for market, but also warrants the attention of 
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governments to support these alternatives through investment 
incentives or other policy instruments. In contrast, countries continue 
to incentivize investment in the tobacco sector (Lencucha et al., 
2016). 
Returning to the earlier question about the nature of the 
relationship between the tobacco industry and governments. Our 
findings point to the conflation of the economic and development 
objectives of many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) with the 
interests of the tobacco industry through the discourses that align the 
two. It is troubling that this dynamic seems particularly common 
among governments in LMICs, which in a context of often-higher 
vulnerability to undue influence, raises serious questions of good 
governance in public health. Our findings suggest that some 
governments are readily accepting these problematic arguments and 
are willing to promote them in prominent international fora like the 
WTO, either because they partly buy into the rhetoric or because they 
are complicit in the tobacco industry's malfeasance. However, there is 
a need to continue to uncover the internal dynamics of governments 
and the relationships among different economic sectors of government 
and tobacco interests. The analysis presented in this paper points to 
the “what” of argumentation, but does not identify the origins or 
process in which these arguments are constructed. We can speculate 
that these arguments, because they mirror familiar industry 
arguments, are derived from tobacco industry influence but this 
postulation needs to be substantiated and explicated through more 
qualitative ethnographic research. Our own research in tobacco-
growing countries suggests that the relationship between the economic 
sector of government and tobacco interests is both overtly and 
covertly visible (Bialous et al., 2014, Chavez et al., 2014, Lencucha 
et al., 2015, Lencucha et al., 2015 and Lencucha et al., 2015b). 
In what is probably the best-case scenario, governments’ “buy-
in” in some tobacco-growing countries may derive in part from their 
precarious economic situations and the perceived role that tobacco 
growing might play in improving them. However, the existing evidence 
of meagre livelihoods for many tobacco farmers and widespread 
environmental degradation associated with tobacco farming suggests 
that governments should revisit these dynamics for the sake of 
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sustainable development more broadly (i.e. both economic and 
ecological) (Lecours, 2014). 
Our study provides the “geography” of the arguments used by 
government representatives to resist tobacco control at the WTO. 
Tobacco control proponents can use this geography to target 
engagement with the economic, agricultural and other sectors of 
government. This type of intersectoral engagement within government 
is not without its challenges. Communicating information about health 
policy issues to non-health sectors is only part of a larger need to 
develop institutions within government that can bring together the 
different sectors while developing rules, norms and strategies that 
work to integrate the different mandates in a way that does not dilute 
health policy (Malone and Bialous, 2014 and Malone et al., 2012). For 
example, our research conducted in the Philippines and Zambia points 
to the continued, often formal, collaboration between the tobacco 
industry and economic sectors of government, one obvious component 
that would hinder intersectoral work (Lencucha et al., 
2015 and Lencucha et al., 2015b). Finally, the themes we identified 
under the three reactionary theses can serve as starting points to 
provide evidence and support to correct misconceptions of the 
economic significance of tobacco. 
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